As a Canadian, I am pleased to be with you at this extraordinary event which has been organized as a counterpart conference to the APEC Leader's Summit here in Manila. It is my understanding that the basis of unity which brings us together in this conference is the recognition that the model of economic globalization that is unfolding in the Asia Pacific and around the world today does, in effect, amount to a new form of imperialism. For me, the question that we need to wrestle with here is what are the driving forces behind this new tiger of imperialism today? Is it the nation-state or is it the transnational corporation that is the engine of economic globalization? What is the relationship between capital and the state in this new era of what we call imperialist globalization?

I do not raise these questions out of a desire to engage in some abstract academic exercise. On the contrary, these are real issues arising out of a concrete struggle against the new free trade regime in my own country. Ten years ago, Canada entered formal negotiations with the United States to develop a new free trade arrangement between the world's two largest trading partners. Three years later, the most comprehensive free trade agreement in the world was signed and sealed. Shortly thereafter, a new round of negotiations began to expand this free trade deal to include Mexico. By the end of 1993, Canada had become firmly locked into a North American economic and political bloc known as the NAFTA, dominated by the United States.

The devastating impacts of this new free trade regime on the lives of Canadians-- the shutdown of our manufacturing plants, the destruction of livelihood for many farmers and workers, the dismantling of our social programs and public services plus the loss of national sovereignty in terms of control over our collective economic, social, ecological and cultural future-- will be presented tomorrow by my colleague Maude Barlow in her presentation. What I want to focus on here are the strategic lessons we have to learn from the popular struggle against free trade. After all, we were able to build, around the free struggle, the largest, single social movement of popular groups in the history of our country, composed of the major peoples' organizations-- workers, women, farmers, environmentalists, teachers, religious, nationalists, artists, and many others. Similar coalitions were also organized against NAFTA in Mexico and the United States, along with a tri-national network coordinating the campaigns of the movements in all three countries.

In Canada, we focused our campaigns against free trade in terms of what we called the corporate agenda. We saw free trade as little more than a bill of rights and freedoms for transnational corporations. We also knew that the driving force behind the deal was a consortium of the 150 largest corporations in the country. But, our strategies and tactics did not measure up to our analysis. Instead of targeting the corporate power that lay behind the free trade agenda, we focused our energies on trying to get the federal government and the major political parties to stop the free trade deal. In the end, it mattered little as to which major political party formed the government (e.g. The Liberal Party, which had opposed free trade in opposition, not only embraced the deal but became its biggest cheerleaders when returned to power in 1993), the free trade agenda was implemented anyway. That's because the real driving forces behind free trade were not simply governments per se, but transnational corporations.

The strategic lesson that emerges from the Canadian st ruggle against free trade is that it is not enough to target the state alone in our campaigns. We must also learn to target the corporate power that lies behind the state. To be sure, the role of the state as an instrument of imperialism varies, often a great deal, between countries. Most of us here experience the state as a repressive regime, whereas as others experience the state as being more benign. In some countries, the state plays an interventionist role while in the others it is more laissez-faire. But, regardless of whether we experience the repressive state or benign, interventionist or laissez-faire, the fact remains that transnational capital is playing a more powerful role than ever before in directing, if not dictating, the priorities of national governments in the new, deregulated global economy. Indeed. we find ourselves living in a new political era, the age of corporate rule.

Global Corporate Rule

Just over a decade ago, the United Nations reported that there were approximately 7,000 transnational corporations operating throughout the world. Today, there are over 40,000 of the species. According to a recent study by the Washington based Institute for Policy Studies, the top 200 of these transnationals now control over a quarter of the world's economic activity. With combined revenues totaling $7.1 trillion, these 200 giants are bigger than the combined economies of 182 countries (out of a total of 191 countries). Indeed, the combined annual revenues of these 200 conglomerates amount to almost twice the combined income of the bottom four fifths of humanity (which adds up to $3.9 trillion).

Of the 100 largest economies in the entire world today, 51 are individual transnational enterprises (three years ago, it was 47). Only 49 of the world's biggest economies are nation-states. Mitsubishi, the largest transnational conglomerate in the world, has more total revenue that the fourth most populous nation on the planet, Indonesia. Wal-Mart is larger than the economies of 161 countries, including Israel, Poland and Greece. Ford's economy is bigger than either Saudi Arabia's or South Africa's. Phillip Morris' annual sales are greater than New Zealand's GDP while General Motor's is greater than Denmark and Toyota's is larger than Norway. And 5 transnationals alone control the 50% of the global market in 7 industries (i.e. consumer durables, automotive, airline, aerospace, electronic components, electrical & electronic, and steel).

Regardless of their home base, the Japanese, American, and European giantshave increasingly become stateless corporations juggling multiple national identities and loyalties to achieve their global competitive interests. No matter where they are operating in the world, these transnational conglomerates can use their overseas subsidiaries, joint venture, licensing agreements, and strategic alliances to assume foreign identities whenever it suits their purposes. In so doing, they develop chameleon like abilities to change their identities to resemble insiders in whatever country they are operating. As one CEO put it: "When we go to Brussels, we're member states of the EEC and when we go to Washington we're an American company too." Whenever they need to, they will wrap themselves in the national flag of their home governments to get support for tax breaks, research subsidies, or governmental representation in negotiations affecting their marketing plans. Through this process, stateless corporations are effectively transforming nation-states to suit their interests in transnational investment and competitiveness.

It is no secret that the world's leading business and governmental elites meet regularly through forums like the Trilateral Commission and the World Economic Forum. Founded in 1973 by David Rockefeller and Zbigmew Brzeninski, the Trilateral Commission was initially composed of 325 leaders in business, government, and civil society in the northern industrial regions of Western Europe, North America, and Japan. The Commission comprises the heads of four of the five largest transnational corporations, five of the world's six international banks, plus the major media corporations in all three regions. Through a behind closed door process of consensus building and deal making, business and governmental elites are able to work out common approaches to economic integration and harmonization of various tax and regulatory measures. In effect, an unelected and unaccountable global elite has managed to take control over the instruments of governance in these three dominant regions of the world.

The economic power wielded by transnational corporations today also has profound political consequences. In most of the industrialized regions of the North, the CEO's of the largest corporations have formed business coalitions for the expressed purpose of realigning the national policies of their governments with the directives of the new global economy. In the United States, for example, the Business Round Table which includes the heads of 42 of the 50 top corporations in the world (including 7 of the 8 top commercial banks, 7 of the 10 largest insurance companies, 5 of the 7 largest retail chains, 7 of the 8 largest transportation companies, and 9 of the 11 top utility companies) has been the driving force behind a wave of new public policy directions ranging from NAFTA to the Contract with America.

In Europe, the mainline coalition of big business is the European Round Table of Industrialists while in Japan it is called the Keindanren. In my own country, we have the Business Council on National Issues which, comprising the CEO's of the 160 largest corporations, virtually operates as a shadow cabinet in Ottawa Over the past 15 years or so, these big business coalitions have waged relentless campaigns around deregulation, privatization, free trade and debt elimination along with a variety of more specific economic and social policy changes. Armed with a network of policy research institutes and public relations firms, they are able to marshal expert analysis, develop policy platforms, conduct opinion polls and organize citizen front groups to change the direction of government policies. Needless to say, their success rate has been nothing short of phenomenal.

As a result, nations states have surrendered most of the powers and tools they once possessed to regulate the operations of transnational corporations to serve the economic, social and environmental needs of their own peoples. Around the world, governments have been deregulating their economies at a furious pace. Between 1991 and 1994, as many as 369 out of a total of 374 major pieces of legislation introduced by the national governments regarding investment by corporations, were designed to eliminate regulations on corporate practices. Under the new free trade regimes like NAFTA, foreign investors not only have the same rights and freedoms as domestic firms, but national governments are also compelled to remove foreign investment requirements, export quotas, local procurements, job content and technology specifications. As Carla Hills, chief U.S. negotiator for both NAFTA and the GATT, put it: "We want corporations to be able to make investment overseas without being required to take a local partner, to export a given percentage of their output, to use local parts, or to meet a dozen other restrictions."

These trends, in turn, are further re-enforced by new forms of governance at a global level. The recently established World Trade Organization (WTO) is designed, for all intents and purposes, to act as a global governing body for transnational corporate interests. In the case of U.S. representation, for example, members of the Advisory Committee for Trade Policy and Negotiations include such corporate giants such as IBM. AT&T, Bethlehem Steel, Time Warner, Corning, Bank of America, American Express, Scott Paper, Dow Chemical, Boeing, Eastman Kodak, Mobil Oil, Amoco, Pfizer, Hewlett Packard, Weyerhauser, and General Motors all of whom are members of the Business Round Table. Furthermore, the WTO is equipped with legislative as well as judicial powers. It has a mandate to eliminate all barriers to international investment and trade. Under the WTO, a group of unelected trade representatives will, in effect, act like a global parliament with the power to override the economic and social policy decisions of national states and democratic legislatures around the world which fail to comply with the new rules for international investment and competition. And, if the EEC and the U.S. are successful in establishing, as the centerpiece of the WTO, the proposed Multilateral Investment Agreement (MAI), starting this December in Singapore, then the WTO's mandate to act on behalf of the interests of transnational capital will be legally entrenched.

In short, what we are experiencing here in the twilight years of the 20th century is a massive shift in power-- out of the hands of nation-states and democratically elected legislatures and into the hands of transnational corporations. Indeed, we are rapidly moving into a new political era in which the destiny of peoples on this planet, North as well as South, is increasingly determined by transnational corporations who have little or no public accountability. This is what we mean by the new age of corporate rule. It is a period in which the political rights of citizens are superseded by the political rights of transnational corporations-- to properly and investment, to mobility of capital and technology, to control over life forms (patents). In this new world order, the security of investors takes precedence over the security of citizens. For countries like India, this means that foreign security forces are now training local police to protect "the life and properly of foreign investors. "

Geo-Politics of APEC

Now, what does all this have to do with APEC? Well, for starters, let's be clear that when those heads of state gather in Subic in a couple of days, they are representing, first and foremost, the interests of transnational capital, not the citizens of their respective countries. As the U.S. Undersecretary of State, Joan Speers, put it while testifying before a U.S. Congressional Committee: "APEC has a customer. APEC is not for governments, it is for business. Through APEC, we aim to get government out of the way, opening the way for business to do business." And, what interests do transnational corporations have in doing business in the Asia Pacific? Simply put, East Asia is seen by the transnational economic elites to be the engine of the world economy in the 21st century.

On the surface, of course, the battle for control of the Asia Pacific through APEC is being fought out between two imperial powers, the United States and Japan. As Walden Bello from Focus South notes, the U.S. and Japan have moved from being Cold War allies to being economic antagonists. On the one hand, the U.S. wants to turn the APEC into a NAFTA like the free trade regime (i.e. GATT plus arrangement) which can provide a framework for U.S. based corporations to build institutional links to East Asia and to pressure Asian trading partners to reform their own economies. On the other hand, Japan (which originated the idea of APEC) does not want APEC turned into a NAFTA like regime simply because Japan itself is currently in the process of establishing its own de facto investment and trade bloc in the region for Japanese based corporations.

For the U.S. and its transnational enterprises, the prime strategic interest in APEC lies in the turning a massive trade deficit into a trade surplus. The U.S. has a $120.2 billion trade deficit with the economies of the Asia region. This amounts to more than 75 per cent of the US' total trade deficit of $159.6 billion. Half of the U.S. trade deficit with Asia ($60 billion annually) lies with Japan alone. Moreover, intra-Asian trade has increased from 47 per cent in 1990 to 53 per cent in 1995 plus Japanese investment in the region has been rising relative to that of the U.S. At a time when Asia is becoming the engine of the world economy, notes Paula Stern, one of the U.S. President Bill Clinton's chief advisors on APEC, "U.S. economic power and influence in East Asia are declining in relative terms."

For Japan and its transnational enterprises, the prime strategic interest in APEC lies in consolidating its own economic power over the region. To do so, Japanese corporations do not need a free trade regime like NAFTA. Instead, their strategy has been to expand investment in the region. Between 1985 and 1994, Japanese enterprises poured S 51 billion worth of new investment in Asia Pacific economies. Indeed, annual Japanese investment of capital in the region rose from $ 5.9 billion in 1991 to $ 6.4 billion in 1993, while annual Japanese investments dropped in Europe (from $ 9.4 to $ 7.0 billion) and in the U.S. (from $ 18.8 to $ 14.6 billion). In 1993, for the first time, Japanese corporate profits from East Asia surpassed those of the U.S.

At this point, the economic clout of both Japanese and U.S. based transnationals should not be underestimated. Fortune's Global 500 includes no less than 153 U.S. based corporations and 141 Japanese based corporations. The 153 U.S. giants, including brand names such as General Motors, Ford Motor, Exxon, Wal-Mart, AT&T, IBM, General Electric, Mobil, Chrysler, Phillip Morris, DuPont, PepsiCo, Dow Chemical, Lockheed, Boeing, McDonalds and many more, have revenues totaling $ 3.2 trillion and profits totaling S 158.03 billion in 1995. The 141 Japanese giants, including brand names like Mitsubishi, Mitsui, Itochu, Sumitomo, Marubeni, Toyota Motor, Nippon Life, Nippon Tel 8t Tel, Nissan Motor, Toshiba, Sony, Honda, Fuji Bank, Fuji Electric, Mitsubishi Motors, Mitsubishi Electric and many more, had revenues totaling S 3.9 trillion and profits totaling S 30.12 billion in 1995.

To advance its strategic interests in the Asia Pacific, the U.S. has been employing a variety of trade weapons at its disposal to create conditions for an APEC free trade regime. As former U.S. trade secretary, Mickey Kantor, declared: "We will continue to use every tool at our disposal-- 301 Super 301, Special 301, Title VII, GSP, the Telecommunications Trade Act, or WTO accession-- to open markets around the world." Several Asian corporations and economies, for example, are at the top of the U.S. hit list of violators of "intellectual properly rights" of U.S. corporations. When it comes to investment in the Asia Pacific, U.S. corporations have put a priority on establishing their own subsidiaries rather than creating joint ventures with local companies. Moreover, U.S. corporations often demand that their host economies accommodate themselves to global trade and investment rules by rewriting their own laws.

At the same time, Japan has been employing a strategic investment plan to secure greater economic control in the Asia Pacific region. According to Bello, the Japanese investment strategy involves three phases: (1) vertical integration through the development of auto and electronics manufacturing plants in other Asian countries; (2) horizontal integration through the development of smaller companies in the region to supply parts for auto and electronics manufacturers; (3) the relocation of heavy and chemical industries to provide steel and petrochemical inputs. In carrying out this investment strategy, Japanese corporations have been putting priority on establishing joint ventures with local companies, emphasizing "co-prosperity" (i.e. Japanese corporate prosperity to be shared with corporate appendages) and adjusting to the trade rules of the host economy.

It appears, therefore, that the battle over APEC will be largely driven by the interplay between these two economic super powers. While the Japanese approach may seem to be more benevolent than that of the U.S., the fact remains that the APEC strategies of both Washington and Tokyo are primarily designed to consolidate their own economic control over the region by expanding the operations of their own transnational corporations. So far, there is no doubt that Japanese corporations are winning on the investment front. By the end of 1993, total new investment by Japanese firms in East and South East Asia had reached S 67 billion, while the U.S. investment totals in the region were S 40 billion. But, the trade weapons which the U.S. has at its disposal for exercising economic pressure and retaliation, should not be underestimated. If the U.S. is successful in its efforts to incorporate an investment treaty as the cornerstone of the new WTO, then their economic and political clout in establishing a NAFTA like APEC will be further augmented.

In any case, the battle over APEC represents a new stage of imperialism in the Asia Pacific. After all, this region has been designated as the growth engine of the world economy, leading into the 21st century. While the maneuvers by Washington and Tokyo are pursued under the guise of globalization and competition, the name of the game is to secure economic and political control over the region. As the two economic superpowers stake out their strategies for APEC, it is important for us to take a closer look at the transnational corporate players which are the driving forces behind their agendas.

APEC's Corporate Players

To identify the major corporate players behind APEC, it might make sense to begin with the APEC Business Advisory Council (ABAC). But, this soon proves to be a dead end. The ABAC is really made up if three representatives from each of the eighteen member countries. With the exception of the U.S. (whose representatives include the chairman of the board of Boeing) and New Zealand (whose representatives include the Minister of Trade), most of the members of ABAC consist of medium size businesses and consultant firms. In developing their recommendations for the APEC Summit leaders, members of the ABAC consult with the CEO's of the major corporations and big business councils in their respective countries. Yet, if we want to get a handle on who are the dominant corporations driving the APEC process, we must look elsewhere.

Another starting point are the various task forces set up under APEC. The energy task force, for example, includes representation from some of the major corporations in the energy industry. But, to get a picture of the main corporate players, we need to take our cues from Antonio Tujan and his colleagues at the IBON Institute here in the Philippines. By taking a look at some of the key sectors of the emerging Asian economy and using data provided by the recent Fortune 500, it is possible to identify some of the main corporate players that are the driving forces behind the development of APEC. Using this method, we can name several Japanese and U. S. corporations that are likely to be on the cutting edge of eight key sectors of the Asian economy. '

Financial Services: Commercial banks will play a strategic role in providing finance capital for Asian development projects under APEC. Six out of the top ten commercial banks in the world are Japanese. They are rated as follows: the Industrial Bank of Japan (2); Sanwa Bank (3); Mitsubishi Bank (4); Fuji Bank (7); Dai-chi Kangyo Bank (8); and the Long Term Credit Bank of Japan (9). The only U.S. bank included in the top ten commercial banks is Citicorp (6). Nevertheless, it is clear that there are powerful financial institutions which are likely to play a pivotal role in the APEC agenda. With this also come increasing pressures to deregulate financial institutions throughout the Asian economy.

Auto Production: Undoubtedly, auto production will be a big factor in any APEC negotiations. Six out of t top ten auto manufacturers in the world are U.S. based corporations-- General Motors (1); Ford Motors (2); Chrysler (7)- and Japanese corporations- Toyota Motor (3); Nissan Motor (5); Honda Motor (9). As we have seen. the Japanese auto industry has already begun to vertically integrate its operations with other Asian countries. Ford and GM have also forged strategic links with Mazda and Toyota to produce for each others markets. However, we can expect a stronger push from U.S. automakers for a much larger piece of the Asian car market in order to offset the U.S. trade deficit.

Agribusiness: A new APEC regime could mean opening the doors of Asian countries to the in influx of more agri-business operations in the region, including U.S. and Japanese producers of farm equipment and agricultural machinery. Three Japanese corporations and two U. S. corporations are listed among the world's top manufacturers of farm equipment: Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (1); Caterpillar (3); Ishikawajima-Harima (5); Kubota (6); and Deere (8). In addition, other major agri-business players such as Cargill and ConAgra, which are heavily involved in greun and beef exports, may see opportunities to expand their operations in East and South East Asia under APEC, along with U.S. food service companies like McDonald's and PepsiCo.

Electronics Industry: A noted above, the Japanese electronics industry has already expanded its operations into several other Asian countries. Japanese corporations such as Hitachi (1), Matsushita (2), and Sony (7) are rated to be among the world's leading electronics manufacturers. But, so are U.S. corporations like General Electric (3) and Motorola (13), which are recognized as having poor labour and environmental record in many places. Under an APEC regime, these U.S. electronic manufacturers will likely demand a much larger piece of the Asian market as well as expand their operations in the region, thereby intensifying competition with Japanese companies.

Energy Projects: The energy task force for APEC has outlined the needs increased energy supplies and infrastructure in the region required for enhanced industrial production. In particular, the task force emphasizes the need for electric and gas utilities. Tokyo Electric Power is rated as the largest electric and gas utility in the world today. Other Japanese companies in this sector include Kansai Electric Power (4), Chubu Electric Power (6), Tohoku Electric Power, and Kyushu Electric Power. Only two U.S. utilities, PG&E (15) and Southern (16), are rated among the major electric and gas companies in the world.

Retail Industry: APEC could also make it profitable for the world's major retail chains to move into the Asian market. Wal-Mart, which is the fourth largest U.S. corporation and the world's biggest retail chain, had revenues totaling S 93.6 billion and a profit margin of S 2.74 billion in 1995. Wal-Mart has already expanded its operations into Mexico as well as Canada under NAFTA and is targeting Asia as its new region for market expansion. Other leading U.S. retail chain stores include Sears Roebuck (2), Kmart (3), and J.C. Penny. Japanese firms are also rated among the world's leading retail companies, including Daei (4); Nichi (7), and Takashimaya (12), as is the Australian retailer, Coles Myer (11).

Telecommunications: The race for control over the Asian market for telecommunications will also be accelerated and intensified under APEC. The Japanese firm, Nippon Tel. & Tel., is rated as the largest telecommunications corporation in the world, with 1995 revenues of S 81.9 billion and profits of S 2.2 billion. But, a host of U.S. corporations are too rated among the world's top telecommunications companies, including AT&T (2), GTE (7), Bellcouth (8), MCI Communications (9), Sprint (12), Bell Atlantic (13), Ameritech (14), and Nynex (15). Since telecommunications is one of the most hotly contested sectors in the world economy today, there is no reason to believe that Asia will be immune to all of this.

Chemical Industry: At the same time, there are signs that chemical production companies (including petrochemical corporations) are likely to increase their interests in Asia, as industrial production in the region expands under APEC. The U.S. chemical giant, DuPont, is the world's leading producer with 1995 revenues totaling S 37.6 billion and profits of S 3.29 billion. Other leading U.S. chemical companies include Dow Chemical (5), Occidental Petroleum (14), and Monsanto (18). Several Japanese firms are also among the world's top chemical producers, including Mitsubishi Chemical (7), Asahi Chemical Ind. (12), and Sumitomo Chemical (15). Most, if not all, have poor environmental track records.

These are only some of the key sectors of the Asian economy that are likely to be directly impacted by the implementation of APEC. It should be clearly understood here that none of this makes much sense unless it is linked to the concrete struggles of popular movements in various APEC countries. Whatever issues and struggles confront our people on a daily basis, it is important that we draw the connections between these struggles and macro-policy issues like APEC. To do so, we must:

a) identify the strategic sectors of the economy that relate to the issues and struggles of our people;

b) name the key corporations that are the major driving forces behind these strategic sectors and related policies of the state;

c) target these corporate players in developing our strategies and tactics for action in relation to the state.

In opposing APEC, it is simply not enough to focus our strategic plans for action on the state alone. We must also target the dominant corporate players that are calling the shots behind the scenes regarding the APEC agenda. In my view, this is the No. I strategic lesson that we have to learn from the campaigns we waged in Canada against both the FTA and NAFTA.

Let me emphasize, however, that we are not talking here about abandoning the state as the strategic focal point for social transformation. Quite the contrary. For all of its problems, the nation-state is still, in my view, the only vehicle we have for achieving the goals of economic and social justice. But, what we are talking about here is the corporate takeover of the state. We are not just dealing with corrupt governments, or repressive governments, or democratic governments. In the new global economy, the common feature is the corporatization of the state. The state is being completely revamped to serve the interests of transnational capital and global corporations. Increasingly, therefore, what we are dealing with are corporate governments which, in effect, means we are all living in a system of global corporate rule. In turn, trade mechanisms like APEC are largely designed to both facilitate and reflect these political realities.

All of this has major strategic ramifications. For, if our objective is to target the state in our struggles for social transformation, then, to be effective, we must also tackle the corporate power that lies behind what the state is doing. Similarly, if our objective is to seize control of the state, then we must also understand the extent to which the state has become captive to the dictates of transnational capital in the new global economy. Indeed, the state will have to be rebuilt and re-tooled, if it is to be equipped to dismantle the mechanisms of corporate rule as well as undertake the priorities and tasks we have for social transformation. In closing, I would also like to take a moment to underscore the importance of the campaign that has been organized by Martin Khor and the Third World Network to stop the moves by the EEC and the OECD countries to incorporate an investment treaty as the centerpiece of the WTO. After all, the WTO is designed to become the primary institutional vehicle for global corporate rule. Placing a Multilateral Agreement on Investment at the center of the WTO will, in effect, constitutionalize a bill of rights and freedoms for transnational corporations in the new global economy. If the OECD is successful in its plan to launch a process for the incorporation of MAI in the WTO, then the momentum that is already building in the direction of global corporate rule will be considerably advanced.

In the recent months, opposition has begun to grow. Countries as politically diverse as Tanzania, Malaysia, India, Egypt, Pakistan and Cuba have expressed serious reservations with the MAI proposal and process. Increasingly, national governments in some Third World countries will be stripped of whatever powers and tools they still have to control and regulate foreign investment by transnational corporations. For the moment, it looks like the MAI has been dropped from the WTO meetings in Singapore next month. But. this is only a matter of time. The incorporation of an investment treaty as the cornerstone of the WTO is essential to the interests of transnational capital. It is thus imperative that we continue to build public opposition in each of our own countries to the MAI, after Singapore. By doing so, we can also generate more critical awareness about APEC and its strategic links to the WTO as mechanism of corporate rule in the new global economy.

Note: the data used here is based on the 1996 Global Fortune 500 Report (Published in July, 1996). The bracket numbers listed below refer to the Report's ranking per sector.